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 This paper will investigate the use of drone strikes by the United States government in its 
ongoing counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East as part of the War on Terror. It will focus on 
the use of drones during the Obama administration and investigate the ways in which the 
program violates both international human rights law and international humanitarian law. It will 
then argue that the United States government’s drone program constitutes a form of collective 
punishment as outlined and prohibited in Geneva Convention IV. In arguing that the drone 
program constitutes a form of collective punishment, the paper hopes to emphasize the gravity of 
violations of international law that the United States is committing. It will examine why the 
United States has been allowed to continue violating international law with little repercussions, 
focusing on the lack of transparency and refusal to disclose information regarding its 
counterterrorist operation. Finally, it will provide suggestions as to how the international 
community can work towards holding the United States accountable to international law in order 
to maintain the credibility of international law and ensure that the basic human rights of all 
individuals are protected and upheld.  
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“I no longer love blue skies. In fact, I now prefer grey skies. The drones do not fly when the skies 
are grey. And for a short period of time, the mental tension and fear eases. When the skies 
brighten, the drones return and so too does the fear.”1 
       Zubair ur-Rehman, aged 13 
North Waziristan, Pakistan 
 
On September 20th, 2001, nine days after the extremist terrorist group Al-Qaeda attacked 
the United States on its own soil, President George W. Bush publically and officially declared 
that the United States of America was at war. This war, which represented a new form of 
international armed conflict, was not declared against a specific group or nation state, but rather 
with an entire ideology in what is commonly known as the “War on Terror”. President Bush 
asserted, “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”2. In doing so, 
President Bush initiated a global war that was not bound by the geographical or temporal 
boundaries that had characterized armed conflict in the past. Rather, the War on Terror served as 
a carte blanch for ongoing United States military operations in the Middle East, lasting for 
sixteen years and counting and profoundly affecting the politics of both the United States and the 
Middle East since 2001. This paper will investigate the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to target 
                                                        
1. “Nabila and the Rehman Family”, Reprieve U.S.: Drones Active Cases 
2. George W Bush. “Special report: terrorism in the US” Address to a Joint Session of Congress 




enemy combatants in the United States’ counterterrorist operations in the Middle East as part of 
the War on Terror.  
The use of unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones, has come to typify the 
current engagement of the United States in several countries in the Middle East under the guise 
of the War on Terror. Although the use of drones was introduced during the Bush era, it is the 
Obama administration that has made drones their weapon of choice in their targeted killings of 
enemy combatants.3 Under the Obama administration, the frequency of drone strikes has 
increased dramatically and expanded territorially to seven countries.4 The significant increase in 
the use of drones by the United States government combined with indications that the frequency 
and capabilities of drone warfare techniques will grow demands that drone warfare by analyzed 
in terms of the ethical and legal considerations that arise surrounding the practice’s adherence to 
international law. 
This paper will examine the use of drone strikes by the United States government through 
the legal frameworks of both international human rights law and international humanitarian law 
to determine whether the practices of the Obama administration have adhered to and upheld the 
standards set forth in international law. It will demonstrate the ways in which the drone program 
has repeatedly violated international human rights law and international humanitarian law, with 
specific reference to the right to life as outlined in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the rules governing armed conflict outlined in the Geneva Conventions. It 
will argue that these violations of international law amount to a war crime in the form of 
                                                        
 
3. Peter L. Bergen and Jennifer Rowland. “Decade of the Drone: Analyzing CIA Drone Attacks, 
Casualties, and Policy” in Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy, ed. Peter L. 
Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 12-41.  
4. Ibid.  
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collective punishment against populations in areas frequented by US drones as defined in 
Geneva Conventions IV. It will then argue that the need for increased transparency by the United 
States government in regards to its drone program is a requirement under international law. 
Lastly, it will argue that the increased transparency will facilitate increased accountability of the 
government towards international human rights law and international humanitarian law, thereby 
ending the impunity that the US has enjoyed thus far. 
 
Obama’s Weapon of Choice 
The first drone strike carried out by the United States government outside of Afghanistan 
as part of counterterrorist operations took place in Yemen in 2002 under the Bush administration 
and targeted and killed six Al-Qaeda operatives.5 The practice was then expanded to Pakistan 
between the years of 2004 and 2007.6 Despite launching the War on Terror and initiating the 
program of drone strikes, the Bush administration is responsible for only 12% of drone strikes 
carried out in Pakistan since 2001.7 It was President Obama who drastically expanded the drone 
program and established drones as the weapon of choice in the War on Terror. The first drone 
strike ordered by the Obama administration took place on January 23rd, 2009, just three days 
after his inauguration, and killed three men, leaving several of their children injured in the 
attack.8 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports that, to date 425 drone strikes have been 
carried out in Pakistan by the United States government, with the Obama administration 
                                                        
5. “CIA ‘killed al-Qaeda suspects’ in Yemen”, BBC, 5 Nov 2002.  
6. Bergen and Rowland, “Decade of the Drone”, 13 
7. Ibid.  
8. Spencer Ackerman, “Victim of Obama’s first drone strike: ‘I am the living example of what drones 
are’”, The Guardian, 23 Jan 2016.  
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authorizing 376 of those strikes.9 These 425 strikes have resulted in between 2,499 and 4,003 
casualties, with high estimates of 966 civilians and 207 children killed.10 Using these figures, 
civilian casualties account for 24-38% of the total number of those killed by US drones in 
Pakistan, with thousands more injured and adversely affected by the practice perpetrated by the 
United States government.   
 US drone strikes in Pakistan are largely concentrated to the region of North Waziristan, 
which shares a border with Afghanistan and is made up of tribal areas where the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda are known to operate. While the United States government claims that these regions house 
most of the top leaders of the terrorist networks, as of December 2013 only 13% of drone strikes 
under the Obama administration have successfully targeted and killed a military leader and less 
than 2% of drone strikes have successfully eliminated high-profile enemy targets.11 While the 
Bush administration employed a policy of very limited strikes to target only top military leaders, 
the Obama administration has expanded the use of drone strikes to target all militants and 
destroy the entire terrorist network in North Waziristan.12 
For the purposes of this paper, the geographic focus will be North Waziristan in Pakistan. 
This will allow for a more specific and detailed scope through which to examine the United 
States’ drone program. Despite this limited geographic focus, the analysis in regards to both 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law can be abstracted to the 
United States drone program more generally, since the policies and procedures employed by the 
                                                        




10. Ibid.  
11. Bergen and Rowland, “Decade of the Drone”, 15 
12. Ibid.  
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United States government are not country-specific but general guidelines used in all of its 
counterterrorism operations in the Middle East in the War on Terror.  
 
 
The Case for Drones 
While recent years have drawn a significant amount of public concern and criticism 
against the United States’ policy of drone warfare, the majority of high-ranking government and 
military officials defend the practice on the basis that drones are the best option of several 
alternatives. Proponents of drone warfare claim that drones are the moral weapon of choice 
because of their advanced technological capabilities to carry out long-term surveillance from a 
strategic vantage point. They argue that these capabilities give drones increased accuracy in 
correctly identifying enemy targets as well as distinguishing between civilians and combatants.13 
Additionally, drones are able to reach and monitor areas that would be difficult to establish an 
on-the-ground presence in, and are therefore highly advanced in their intelligence gathering 
capabilities.14 Proponents of drone warfare therefore emphasize that, strategically, drones are 
militarily advantageous to the drone-wielding power; in this case, the United States. 
 Proponents of drone warfare also argue that drones are an effective way to engage in 
military activity because they fall short of a full-scale ground operation.15 Drones are seen as a 
responsible weapon in the sense that they are more limited and constrained as compared to a 
ground military intervention. President Obama has stated that the alternative to drones, which 
                                                        
13. David True. “Disciplining Drone Strikes: Just War in the Context of Counterterrorism” in Drone 
Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy, ed. Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 285-299.  
14. Ann Rogers and John Hill. Unmanned: Drone Warfare and Global Security. (Pluto Press, 2014).  
15. Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun. “The Implications of Drones on the Just War Tradition”.Ethics 
and International affairs, vol. 25, no. 3 (2011), 337-358.  
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would be a ground intervention, would result in “more U.S. deaths, more Black Hawks down, 
more confrontations with local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of such 
raids that could easily escalate into new wars”.16 Given that, “drones seem to manifest a less 
obvious trespass than a manned incursion, making a lower imposition on national sovereignty”, 
advocates of drones defend the practice on the claim that drones uphold the principle of 
proportionality that is enshrined in international humanitarian law, a claim that will be disputed 
in this paper.17  
 Finally, drones are particularly useful to the United States government because of the 
separation factor that exists between the targets and the soldier. This separation factor means that 
there is no risk of physical harm present to the person carrying out the drone strike, which 
significantly reduces the number of American casualties as compared to ground combat and the 
deployment of troops.18 The elimination of physical risk allows the United States to carry out its 
military operations in a more limited and less dangerous fashion without any risk to American 
life. This is also politically strategic in garnering public support, as drone warfare has become a 
widely supported alternative for military engagement amongst the American people, who are 
more likely to oppose the physical deployment of American troops to the Middle East.19  
Furthermore, advocates of drones argue that, by removing the individual responsible for firing 
the drone from a situation of combat, more caution and clarity of thought is exercised, which 
results in more accurate strikes that decrease collateral damage.20 
                                                        
16. Barack H. Obama. “Remarks by the President at the National Defence University”. National Defence 
University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. 23 May 2013.  
17. Rogers and Hill, Unmanned: Drone Warfare and Global Security, 2 
18. Brunstetter and Braun, “The Implications of Drones”, 350 
19. Ibid.  
20. Ibid., 351 
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 This paper will challenge the assumptions made by proponents of drone warfare that 
drones represent a “moral weapon of choice” because of their increased ability to accurately 
identify enemy combatants, engage in limited warfare, or limit collateral damage to civilian 
populations. This paper will not argue that drones are inherently an illegal weapon under the 
framework of international law. Rather, it will focus on examining the specific policies, 
programs, and guidelines employed by the United States government under the Obama 
administration in order to show that the current program of drone warfare violates international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law by failing to uphold the human right to life, 
as outlined in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966. It will then argue that, beyond 
violations of the right to life, the drone program constitutes a form of collective punishment as 




International Legal Frameworks  
 In order for an accurate analysis of the United States’ policy of drone warfare to be made, 
the international legal framework through which drones should be examined must first be 
established. The launch of the War on Terror in 2001 has since generated much discussion and 
controversy regarding the nature of the conflict and whether it may be regarded as an armed 
conflict. Establishing the nature of the engagement between the United States and Pakistan is 
crucial in determining whether international humanitarian law or international human rights law 
will apply.  
In a speech made by Harold Koh, the Legal Advisor to the Department of State at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law on March 25th 2010, Koh 
asserted that, “as a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-
Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and 
may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defence under international law”.21 Since 
the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the United States government has consistently asserted that 
it is engaged in an armed conflict with terrorist forces.22 Although the legitimacy of this claim of 
armed conflict has been challenged for whether it adheres to the internationally established 
definition of armed conflict, for the purposes of this paper, it will be accepted that the United 
States of America is actively engaged in war, as it claims to be, and therefore, bound by 
international humanitarian law.  
In accepting that the United States is engaged in armed conflict, the term “non-
international armed conflict” is evoked to describe the nature of the armed conflict between the 
                                                        
21. Koh, Harold Hongju. “The Obama Administration and International Law”. Annual Meeting of  





United States and terrorist forces in Pakistan. Since the United States is not engaged in combat 
with the State of Pakistan, and instead is fighting terrorist forces that are independent but within 
the territory of Pakistan, the conflict is considered non-international in nature.23 The notion of 
non-international armed conflict was first introduced in the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions, which expanded on the definition of war to include armed conflict with non-state 
actors.24 
 
International Human Rights Law vs. International Humanitarian Law 
The engagement in armed conflict does not, under international law, absolve States of 
their obligations under international human rights law. While traditional approaches to 
international law may have seen international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law as mutually exclusive frameworks, with the first being applicable to times of peace and the 
second governing the conduct of armed conflict, recent developments in international law stress 
that they are in fact concurrent frameworks of law25. A number of resolutions, court rulings, and 
customary law provisions establish that international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law overlap in their application in order to ensure the protection of human rights, 
regardless of the context.26 International human rights law has now been established as a 
complimentary legal framework to international humanitarian law. This congruence, however, is 
not a bidirectional congruent application. While it has been established that international human 
                                                        
23. Robert Barnidge. “A Qualified Defence of American Drone Attacks in Northwest Pakistan 
under International Humanitarian Law”. Boston University International Law Journal, vol. 30, no. 409, 
(2012), 409-447. 
24. Ibid., 423 
25. Shah, Sikander Ahmed. International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan: The legal and 
sociopolitical aspects. (Routledge, 2015).  
26. Ibid., 111 
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rights law continues to apply in situations of armed conflict, it is not the case that international 
humanitarian law can apply outside situations of armed conflict.27  
The Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, in expanding on the definition of 
war to include non-international armed conflict with non-state actors, stresses the congruence of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law. In the preamble, the 
obligation to uphold human rights treaties in times of conflict is reiterated, reading “Recalling 
furthermore that international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to the 
human person”.28 Several United Nations Security Council resolutions have also reaffirmed that 
international human rights law continues to apply in instances of armed conflict alongside 
international humanitarian law.29 Furthermore, the International Criminal Court ruled that the 
rights outlined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights 
treaties continue to apply in armed conflict, writing that “the right not arbitrarily to be deprived 
of one’s life applies also in hostilities”.30 The current customary international law conclusively 
holds that times of armed conflict do not absolve states of their obligation under international 
law to uphold human rights, both within their territory and within the territorial context of the 
enemy actors. One of these human rights that must be upheld even within the context of war is 
the right to life as outlined in Article VI of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 
The United States government, as outlined in the Operational Law Handbook of the 
United States Army of 2015, maintains a strict policy position of non-extraterritoriality in 
                                                        
27. Ibid., 112 
28. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 
29. Shah, International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 119 
30. Ibid. , 116 
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regards to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, despite a great deal of 
criticism from the international community and human rights organizations.31 This means that 
the United States only recognizes its obligations to individuals who are both within the territory 
and jurisdiction of the United States but maintains that it has no obligations under international 
human rights law to uphold the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in regards to 
individuals who do not meet these two requirements. This effectively means that international 
human rights law “do[es] not create treaty-based obligations for U.S. forces operating outside 
U.S. territory” and that the United States has no obligation under international law to uphold the 
right to life in regards to individuals outside its territory in the areas in which they are militarily 
engaged in counterterrorist operations.32 This interpretation of non-extraterritoriality is one that 
has been condemned by the United Nations Human Rights Committee, who has voiced 
disagreement and reaffirmed that international human rights treaties apply to individuals both 
within and outside of United States’ territory, including in instances of armed conflict.33  
The Human Rights Committee has consistently emphasized the extraterritorial 
applicability of core human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, in times of conflict.34 General Comment 29 of the Human Rights Committee 
explicitly states that, “The Covenant requires that even during an armed conflict measures 
derogating from the Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a 
threat to the life of the nation…On a number of occasions the Committee has expressed its 
concern over States parties that appear to have derogated from rights protected by the Covenant, 
                                                        
31. “Operational Law Handbook”, International and Operational Law Department: The Judge Advocate 
General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army (Charlottesville, Virginia, 2015)  
32. Ibid., 52 
33. UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations 
during a State of Emergency, paragraph 3, 31 August 2001, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 
34. Shah, International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 126 
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or whose domestic law appears to allow such derogation in situations not covered by article 4”.35 
Additionally several United Nations bodies have repeatedly expressed concern for the United 
States’ lack of concern for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and violations 
of the right to life through their use of drone strikes.36 The refusal of the United States to 
acknowledge the extraterritoriality of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and other core human rights treaties, and accept their obligation to uphold these treaties in their 
counterterrorism operations, is a violation of international law.  
This section has established that international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law are mutually applicable in situations of armed conflict like the one that the 
United States is currently engaged in as part of the War on Terror. Given that human rights 
treaties continue to be binding in situations of armed conflict and create obligations on states 
beyond their sovereign territory, it follows that the United States is obligated under international 
law to uphold the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights while conducting its 
program of drone warfare, despite its refusal to recognize this obligation. The next section will 
focus on investigating the manner in which the Obama administration’s drone program fails to 
respect and uphold international human rights law and international humanitarian law with 
particular reference to the “right to life” as outlined in Article IV of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.  
                                                        
35. UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, para. 3 
36. Including but not limited to the Human Rights Council and Special Rapporteaur on extrajudicial, 
summary and arbitrary execution, the United Nations  
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Drones and the Right to Life 
Article VI of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that, “Every 
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life”.37 The Human Rights Committee, which is the treaty body of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, further elaborated on the right to life in 
General Comment 6, which states, “The Committee considers that States parties should take 
measures not only to prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to prevent 
arbitrary killing by their own security forces.”38 As has previously been established, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is an extraterritorially binding treaty that 
continues to apply in instances of armed conflict. Therefore, it is legally binding under 
international law that the United States government upholds the right to life and the right to not 
be arbitrarily deprived of life in its use of drone strikes as part of the War on Terror.39  
Despite the claims by proponents of drone warfare that drones are technologically 
advanced with increased capabilities of identification, making it easier to differentiate between 
civilians and combatants and thereby prevent civilian casualties, the international community has 
expressed concern regarding the ease with which drones allow force to be used. In a report on the 
use of drones to the General Assembly, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions expressed concern that, “drones make it not only physically 
easier to dispatch long-distance and targeted armed force, but the proliferation of drones may 
lower social barriers in society against the deployment of lethal force and result in attempts to 
                                                        
37. UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, Article VI 
38. UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), 30 
April 1982, paragraph 3 
39. Shah, International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 126 
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weaken the relevant legal standards”.40 The concern is that, due to the little to no risk posed to 
American life and the ease with which drone strikes can be used to target and kill enemy 
combatants, drones encourage the use of lethal force in instances in which lethal force would 
otherwise be unacceptable, thereby violating the principle of proportionality of international 
humanitarian law. The report of the Special Rapporteur also expresses concern at the use of 
drones to undermine international human rights law and emphasizes once again the applicability 
of human rights treaties in situations of armed conflict. In reference to drone warfare in 
particular, the report states that “States are bound to ensure the realization of the right to life 
when they use force, whether inside or outside their borders”.41  
The United States’ program of drone warfare to target and eliminate terrorist forces has 
raised serious legal concerns within the international community regarding its ability to adhere to 
the principle of the right to life. Concerns stem from the use of drones to conduct targeting 
killings of enemies, which may, under certain circumstances amount to extrajudicial killings. 
The Special Rapporteur defines targeted killings as, “the intentional, premeditated and deliberate 
use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed 
group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the 
perpetrator.”42 
Targeted killings are a legitimate and accepted aspect of international humanitarian law 
and are legally defensible in times of armed conflict. There are, however, certain provisions and 
                                                        
40. United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions,13 Sep. 2013, A/68/382, Section III para. 17 
41. Ibid., Section III, para. 43 
42. United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary 





principles that govern the use of targeted killings and the use of lethal force against enemy 
combatants. The two principles that govern the use of targeted killings in times of armed conflict 
are the principle of discrimination and the principle of proportionality.43 The next section will 
examine the specific programs and guidelines employed by the United States government in 
identifying enemy combatants to be targeted through a closer investigation into these two 
principles. First, however, it will be examined whether or not the United States holds a legitimate 
claim to self-defence in its use of targeted killings.  
 
Just Cause  
In his speech to the National Defence University in May 2013, President Obama stated,  
“America’s actions are legal.  We were attacked on 9/11.  Within a week, Congress 
overwhelmingly authorized the use of force.  Under domestic law, and international law, 
the United States is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces.  We are 
at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if 
we did not stop them first.  So this is a just war - a war waged proportionally, in last 
resort, and in self-defence.”44 
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States government has consistently invoked its 
right to self-defence under international law to justify the War on Terror and the accompanying 
practice of drone strikes. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter upholds a State’s right to self-
defence, stating, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
                                                        
43. United Nations Human Rights Council, Summary of the Human Rights Council interactive panel 
discussion of experts on the use of remotely piloted aircraft or armed drones in compliance with 
international law, 15 Dec 2014, A/HRC/28/38, Section III, para. 23 
44. Obama, “Remarks by the President”, 2013 
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the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.”45 
While the right to self-defence is protected under international law, there are certain 
criteria that must be met in order for the claim of self-defence to be legitimate. There are several 
different types of self-defence that hold differing levels of legitimacy in customary international 
law. Firstly, it is accepted that Article 51 protects the right of States to respond with force not 
only to an armed attack that has already occurred, but also to an anticipated attack.46 This form 
of self-defence, known as anticipatory self-defence, is protected if a threat is proved to meet the 
requirements of immediacy and imminence. If there is evidence to suggest that an armed attack 
by an enemy force is both immediate and imminent, then a state may rightfully invoke their right 
to anticipatory self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.47 While both the 
requirements of immediacy and imminence were arguable met in the immediate aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, neither of the two criteria can legitimately be met fifteen years after the 
attacks in order to justify continued anticipatory self-defence.  
Rather, the United States under the Bush administration invoked its right to pre-emptive 
self-defence. Pre-emptive self-defence refers to the use of force against a threat that is present 
but may not meet the requirements of immediacy and imminence.48 In his National Security 
Strategy Address of 2002, President Bush claimed, “Given the goals of rogue states and 
terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. 
The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of 
potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that 
                                                        
45. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Article 51.  
46. Shah, International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 31 
47. Ibid.  
48. Ibid., 45 
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option. We cannot let our enemies strike first” and that “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts 
by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively”.49 
This invocation of the right to strike pre-emptively became known as the Bush Doctrine 
and has characterized the United States government’s approach to warfare since. The current 
drone strikes of the War on Terror are no longer self-defence of an immediate and imminent 
attack, but rather pre-emptive self-defence. However, this notion is not explicitly or implicitly 
protected under Article 51 as, “the right to attack another state on the basis of anticipatory or pre-
emptive self defence is not available under the UN Charter” or anywhere else in international 
law.50 Other defences of the United State’s drone strikes in Pakistan have claimed the right to 
preventive self-defence, which refers to the use of force to eliminate the possibility of an enemy 
force mounting the capability to launch an attack.51 Preventive self-defence refers to preventing a 
threat before the threat can even materialize. This form of self-defence is largely rejected by the 
international community and considered illegal under international law as it mounts to a form of 
aggression.52 Therefore, the claim to legitimate self-defence on the basis of both pre-emption and 
prevention by the United States government in its use of targeted drone strikes are not considered 
legitimate under international law as they fail to meet the requirements of immediacy and 
imminence that are required for anticipatory self-defence, thereby making the claim to self-
defence of the United States government contestable in its legitimacy.53  
                                                        
49. George W Bush. “U.S. National Security Strategy: Prevent Our Enemies From Threatening Us, Our 
Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction” 20 Sept. 2002 (italics mine) 
50. Shah, International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 15 
51. Craig Martin, “Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defence and the Jus ad Bellum Regime” in 
Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World ed. Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin 
and Andrew Altman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 223-252 
52. Ibid., 244 
53. Ibid., 247 
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 The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions voiced concern 
regarding the prolonged use of self-defence to justify the drone program and counterterrorism 
efforts of the United States, writing that, “The right to self-defence persists only for so long as it 
is necessary to halt or repel an armed attack and must be proportionate to that aim…States are 
not entitled to continue to act in self-defence until the absolute destruction of the enemy is 
achieved, such that the enemy poses no long-term threats.”54 The use of the claim to pre-emptive 
and preventive self-defence cannot be used under international law to justify the drone program 
of the United States government.  
 It is important to challenge the claim to legitimate self-defence used by the United States 
government in order to demonstrate the flaws and lack of credibility of this claim, thereby 
challenging the entire claim that underpins the drone program and continued War on Terror. 
Despite the lack of legitimacy of this claim of self-defence, the United States has continued to 
allow it to define the policies and practices that it uses to target supposed enemy combatants. 
These policies and practices will be the focus of the next section of this paper.  
 
Discrimination 
 The principle of discrimination during armed conflict is one of the most essential 
principles of international humanitarian law. The principle of discrimination holds that, in 
accordance with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, persons not actively engaged in 
armed conflict, including former combatants no longer participating in conflict, shall not be 
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deprived of their right to life or be targeted for military purposes.55 It is based on the 
underpinning belief that individuals hold inalienable rights to life and liberty even within the 
context of war and that measures must be taken by all warring parties to protect these rights.56 
Proponents of drone warfare advertise drones as the moral weapon of choice largely for their 
supposed advanced ability to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, thereby 
making drones better at avoiding civilian casualties and adhering to the principle of 
discrimination as opposed to more direct and traditional forms of warfare.57  
This section will refute this claim, arguing that drone warfare fails to meet the essential 
requirement of international humanitarian law of discrimination between combatants and non-
combatants for three reasons; firstly, the “drone myth” that drones are better at distinguishing 
and identifying combatants, secondly, the separation factor that encourages the use of lethal 
force against combatants and by extension civilians, and finally, the definition of a combatant 
used by the United States government and its prolific use of “signature strikes”. Drone warfare 
raises concerns regarding the principle of discrimination in relation to the specific regulations, 
definitions, and policies employed by the United States government when identifying and 
targeting enemy combatants.  
The nature of the armed conflict that the United States is engaged in already raises 
concerns regarding discrimination, and this is compounded by the lack of transparency 
surrounding the practice of drone strikes. The Obama administration’s current policy is to 
consider everyone remotely affiliated in some way or another with either Al-Qaeda or the 
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Taliban as an enemy combatant, even those not engaged actively in threatening terrorist 
activities.58 The United States government under Obama has consistently maintained that 
terrorist organizations have, “no non-military wing, so all members, whether bomb makers, 
propagandists or drivers are fair game, and the list of targets grows ever longer, covering threats 
so far down the command chain that they are likely not threats at all”.59 This failure to 
distinguish between active combatants and individuals that are peripherally connected to a 
terrorist organization who do not pose a legitimate threat is a violation of the principle of 
discrimination under international humanitarian law.  
 In an article published in The New York Times, information from several officials of the 
Obama administration revealed that the definition of a combatant used to authorize lethal drone 
strikes was extremely vaguely defined, and that the Obama administration, “in effect counts all 
military-age males in a strike zone as combatants…unless there is explicit intelligence 
posthumously proving them innocent.”60 This information, coupled with the fact that the United 
States refuses to disclose the criteria that it employs to identify enemy combatants that are then 
put onto a ‘kill list’ raises serious concerns regarding the principle of discrimination and the 
ethical conduct of the United States government in its use of drone strikes.61 Using a broad and 
ambiguous definition of combatant, such as the one stated above, allows the US to re-categorize 
many civilians as combatants and manipulate the definition of combatant in order to circumvent 
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its obligation to be discriminatory in its targeted drone strikes. This is illegal under international 
law as it strips many civilians of their civilian status and thereby denies them the rights and 
protections given to them under international humanitarian law.62 Particularly, by taking away 
their civilian status and classifying them as combatants that can be legitimately targeted, the 
United States government is violating the right of these civilians to not be arbitrarily denied of 
their life, which violates the right to life as articulated in Article VI of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.  
The methodology used by United States officials in determining targets is a further cause 
for concern. The majority of drone strikes are classified as ‘signatory strikes’, denoting that 
individuals are targeted on the basis of behaviour, rather than confirmed identity.63 Personality 
strikes, which make up the minority of authorized drone strikes, target individuals whose 
identities are known and have been confirmed. These types of strikes are usually used to target 
high profile enemy combatants and the United States government is typically quite transparent in 
their use of personality strikes.64 Signature strikes, on the other hand, constitute the majority of 
drone strikes and involve the authorized use of lethal force against supposed enemy combatants 
despite having no confirmation of the individual’s identity.65 Signature strikes “target individuals 
simply because they exhibit a behaviour the US considers threatening”.66 The observed 
behaviour of the enemy target is deemed to be significant enough to warrant lethal force. 
However, the United States refuses to disclose the behavioural criteria by which an individual is 
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deemed a significant enough threat to justify lethal action.67 The use of signature strikes greatly 
increases the probability of civilians being either mistaken for combatants or deliberately 
targeted in drone strikes given that the definition of a combatant employed by the United States 
allows for a great deal of ambiguous middle ground.  
This policy of signature strikes has come under scrutiny by various United Nations 
bodies for its failure to uphold the principle of discrimination under international humanitarian 
law and for the lenience that it gives the United States government in selecting individuals to be 
targeted. The report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions 
writes of signature strikes, “This is not a concept known to international humanitarian law and 
could lead to confusion… Insofar as the term “signature strike” refers to targeting without 
sufficient information to make the necessary determination, it is clearly unlawful”.68  
The Human Rights Council further reported concerns that the prolific use of signature 
strikes, in addition to violating the principle of discrimination “takes no account of the principles 
of necessity and proportionality in the use of force”.69 This policy of signature strikes that 
constitutes the main method by which individuals are selected for targeting by drone strikes 
raises several concerns regarding the principle of discrimination under international humanitarian 
law and facilitates the targeting of civilians that cannot legitimately be considered enemy 
combatants. In this way, the use of signature strikes violates the right to life as articulated in 
Article VI of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
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 The principle of proportionality in international humanitarian law governs the kinds of 
force that are ethically permissible within the context of war. It is intended to limit the damage 
that occurs within armed conflict and ensures that the force employed is proportional to the 
threat posed.70 The section will show that the current program of drone strikes by the United 
States fails to adhere to the principle of proportionality by examining the high civilian death toll 
as reported by several human rights organizations and United Nations bodies. As previously 
stated, nearly 1000 civilians have been killed in drones strikes in North Waziristan alone, 207 of 
which were children.71 Furthermore, only 13% of drone strikes authorized by the Obama 
administration have successfully targeted and eliminated military leaders of terrorist 
organizations.72 The high death toll amongst civilian populations is justified by the United States 
as being collateral damage, which is an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of any war that is 
protected and recognized under international humanitarian law.73 The question, however, is 
whether the civilian cost can be justified under international humanitarian law through the 
principle of proportionality.  
 The principle of proportionality holds that the damage to a civilian population must not 
exceed the relative benefits that would be achieved in a military operation and that there must be 
an imminent threat that justifies the damage to civilians.74 As iterated in the report of the Special 
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Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the principle of proportionality in 
times of armed conflict states that, “it is prohibited to carry our an attack which may be expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated”.75 This principle includes an assumed requirement that all measures will 
be taken to ensure that proper distinction is made between civilians and combatants. Given that it 
has been established in the previous section that the United States government not only does not 
take all proper precautions, but also actively employs definitions and policies that allows it to 
expand the definition of combatant, and thereby does not adhere to the principle of distinction, 
this threatens its ability to adhere to the principle of proportionality.  
 One of the key advancements in the use of drone technology is the facilitated ability to 
deploy lethal force remotely. Drone technology allows for increased ease in military operations 
targeting enemy combatants because they involve little to no risk to the wielding power. 
However, given the indication of increased use of drone warfare in the future, this has raised 
concerns regarding the principle of proportionality; specifically, whether the ease with which 
drones are used to eliminate targets violates the principle of proportional use of lethal force. The 
use of drones may, “lower social barriers in society against the deployment of lethal force and 
result in attempts to weaken the relevant legal standards”.76 It is an established facet of the 
principle of proportionality under international humanitarian law that lethal force not be used 
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except in the case that the target presents an imminent and immediate threat to other individuals 
or to the state that requires the deployment of deadly force.77  
In cases in which the target does not pose an imminent and immediate threat, it is 
expected that other non-lethal methods be used to capture or neutralize the target. However, in 
many cases of drone strikes, it has been found that, “armed drones were often not used to counter 
an imminent threat or where there were no other alternatives” and that there had been “dozens of 
drone strikes in North Waziristan where there was no evidence that the individual killed posed an 
imminent threat to another individual, or to the State”.78 Furthermore, as stated earlier, only 13% 
of drone strikes under the Obama administration have successfully targeted and killed a military 
leader and less than 2% of drone strikes have successfully eliminated high-profile enemy 
targets.79 This leaves the vast majority of drone strikes as failing to eliminate targets that pose an 
imminent and immediate threat, thereby failing to adhere to the principle of proportionality. This 
failure to use only proportional force means that the civilian impact of drones has far exceeded 
the military benefit incurred. The high civilian death toll as a result of failure to use proportional 
force violates both international humanitarian law and international human rights law and 
constitutes a violation of the right to life.  
The first section of this paper has focused on outlining the different policies and practices 
of the United States’ drone warfare program and the way in which several different aspects of 
this program violate the fundament right to life as outlined in Article VI of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. To do so, it first examined the legal framework through 
which drone strikes must be examined and established that international humanitarian law and 
                                                        
77. United Nations Human Rights Council, Summary on the Human Rights Council interactive panel, 
Section III, para. 16 
78. Ibid.  
79. Bergen and Rowland, “Decade of the Drone”, 15 
26 
 
international human rights law are congruent legal frameworks and that human rights treaties, 
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, continue to be legally binding 
and obligatory on states in times of armed conflict. It established that, despite the position of the 
United States military, the United States government is obligated under international law to 
adhere to the provisions outlined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
because human rights treaties must be applied extraterritorially. This means that the right to life 
must be upheld by the United States while conducting drone strikes as part of their 
counterterrorism program.  
The paper then investigated the different factors of international law that must be 
considered when examining the legality of drone strikes. Firstly, it considered the claim to self-
defence that gives the United States a just cause and the right of self-defence as outlined in 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It showed that, given that the right to pre-emptive self-
defence is not protected under international law, the claim to self-defence by the United States 
government does not legitimate or justify their practice of drone warfare. Furthermore, this paper 
considered the requirements of discrimination and proportionality under international 
humanitarian law as fundamental requirements for respecting the right to life. It showed that the 
definitions and policies employed by the United States government in identifying and targeting 
supposed enemy combatants often violates the principle of the right to life. The next section of 
this paper will argue that these violations of international law constitute a form of collective 





Drones as a form of Collective Punishment 
 Recent years have witnessed a rise in the amount of attention that Obama’s drone 
program has received from the international community. For the first several years of his 
presidency, Obama’s prolific use of drone strikes as part of American counterterrorism efforts 
received very little public attention from both the international and domestic community. 
However, following the killing of American citizen Anwar Al-Awlaki in September of 2011 and 
the killing of his American son two weeks later, the American public and the international 
community became increasingly aware of the drone program and the accompanying high civilian 
death toll that it was leaving behind.80 Since then, the legality (or lack thereof) of the United 
States government’s drone program and counterterrorism activities have come under an 
increasing amount of criticism and scrutiny by the United Nations and accompanying 
international bodies, and human rights organizations. There is also a vast body of literature that 
has analysed and documented the human rights abuses and violations of international law that the 
United States has engaged in over the last decade. The Obama administration’s drone program is 
widely regarded in the international community as violating international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law and several United Nations reports have explicitly condemned the 
actions of the United States government and called on them to uphold their obligations under 
international law.  
 The existing literature and international documentation of violations of international law, 
however, continue to treat the United States government’s repeated human rights violations as a 
group of individual instances of abuses rather than attempting to provide a more structural 
analysis of what has become an ongoing pattern of violations of human rights and blatant 
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disregard for international law. The following section of this paper will argue that the drone 
program should not be seen simply as a number of instances of violations of international law in 
the context of armed conflict but rather as part of a larger and more serious violation of 
international humanitarian law. It will expand on the previous section, which showed that the 
drone program violates the right to life as outlined in Article VI of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, by arguing that the United States’ drone program and the civilian 
impact that it has constitutes a form collective punishment as defined and prohibited in Geneva 
Convention IV. It will argue that the failure to take proper measure to distinguish between 
civilians and combatants, the failure to adhere to the proportional use of lethal force, and the 
deliberate targeting of civilians through double-tap strikes and strikes against civilian gatherings 
constitute collective punishment against the residents of areas frequented by United States 
drones. It will then further expand on the adverse civilian impact of drone strikes to support this 
claim. Finally, it will argue that, through framing it as a form of collective punishment, the 
international community must recognize the gravity of the situation and demand an end to the 
impunity enjoyed by the United States government.  
Article 33 of Geneva Convention IV of 1949 clearly prohibits the practice of collective 
punishment, stating “No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not 
personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of 
terrorism are prohibited.”81 The prohibition of collective punishment is reaffirmed again in both 
Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1977, 
which both state, “All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in 
hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, 
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honour and convictions and religious practices” and then continues to say that “the following 
acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and 
in any place whatsoever”, listing collective punishment specifically as one of the acts that is 
strictly prohibited.82  
As has been established in the previous section, the United States’ drone program 
routinely violates international human rights law and international humanitarian law with 
specific regards to the right to life. Additionally, there is evidence and documentation to suggest 
that these instances of violations of the right to life are not accidental and cannot be classified 
under the term “collateral damage” in times of armed conflict because it often involves a 
deliberate targeting of non-combatants. While the United States government claims to only target 
combatants involved in hostile activities, various reports by human rights organizations suggest 
otherwise. Furthermore, many nation states have expressed disapproval at the current practice of 
drone strikes, saying that “the deaths of civilians could not be qualified as ‘collateral damage’” 
and that “no threat to security could justify such attacks”.83  
 
Deliberately Targeting Civilians  
International humanitarian law requires that warring parties not only not intend to harm 
civilians, but actively take measures to ensure that the damage to civilian populations will be 
limited.84 There is evidence that suggest that the United States government has deliberately 
targeted civilians in drone strikes in attacks on a mosque, a funeral, and eleven reported cases of 
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double-tap strikes targeting first responders and rescuers after the first strike.85 Double-tap 
strikes refer to the practice of following one drone strike that may have targeted militant forces 
with another subsequent strike that targets those that are the first responders to the scene of the 
strike. The first responders are mostly made up of those rushing to help or rescue the injured and 
the grieving of those killed. Double-tap strikes are typically employed in warfare as a method of 
neutralizing the enemy. However, this practice functionally targets the civilians that respond to 
the attack and is therefore a violation of international humanitarian law that stipulates that 
civilians must not be the targets of military activities.86   
The use of double-tap strikes to target civilian first responders constitutes not only a 
violation of international humanitarian law, but also a war crime as defined in the Geneva 
Conventions.87 The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions 
expressed concern at the use of double-tap drone strikes as part of counterterrorist programs and 
reaffirmed their illegality under international law saying, “Where one drone attack is followed up 
by another in order to target those who are wounded and hors de combat or medical, personnel, it 
constitutes a war crime in armed conflict and a violation of the right to life, whether or not in 
armed conflict.”88  Residents of North Waziristan admit that, when a drone strikes, they no 
longer rush to the scene to aid the victims because they are afraid of being targeted in a double-
tap strike.89 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism has documented at least six cases of civilians 
being targeted in double-tap strikes in North Waziristan, killing tens of civilians and those 
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rushing to the scene to provide medical assistance.90 The widespread human rights implications 
of this practice will be discussed the next section of this paper.  
There is further evidence as documented by both the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions and the Human Rights Council that indicates that the United 
States government has repeatedly used drone strikes to target civilian centres and gatherings. The 
Human Rights Council has documented the cases of at least three separate drone strikes between 
2006 and 2009 in which civilians were deliberately targeted. In these three cases on a madrasa 
(school), which killed 80 schoolchildren as young as age 7 were killed, on a funeral at which 
another 80 civilians were killed, and on a village council meeting in which 40 attendees were 
killed, not a single enemy combatant or militant was killed.91 The use of drone strikes to 
deliberately target civilians and the use of lethal force against non-combatants constitutes a war 
crime and violates several key tenants of international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law.92 The targeting of civilians violates the right to life by depriving civilians of the right 
to not be arbitrarily deprived of life despite not being involved in any kind of direct military or 
terrorist activities that would legitimate them as targets. The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions therefore concluded that “the current use of drones in Pakistan 
threatened and undermined the right to life and the rule of law more broadly”.93 The use of drone 
strikes to deliberately target civilian populations in the form of double-tap strikes targeted strikes 
against civilian centres constitutes both a war crime in the form of collective punishment and a 
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gross violation of the right to life as stipulated in Article VI of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.  
 
 
Social, Political, and Economic Effects  
The damage done to civilian populations living in regions frequented by the United 
States’ drone strikes surpass death tolls and civilian casualties. The civilian consequences of 
drone strikes extend far beyond the immediacy of death, injury and destruction to touch almost 
every single aspect of civilian life in these areas. In order to provide a comprehensive and 
accurate depiction of the way in which drone strikes violate both international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law and function as a form of collective punishment, these 
civilian consequences will be explored further.  
The use of double-tap strikes has caused civilians in the vicinity of drone strikes to 
refrain from going to the scene of the strike in order to rescue and assist the injured because of a 
fear that they will be the targets of a second strike.94 Civilians in North Waziristan cited this fear 
of double-tap strikes and stressed that it, “inhibited the provision of emergency medical 
assistance from humanitarian workers”.95 Double-tap strikes deter both community members and 
professional aid workers from providing the necessary assistance to victims of drone strikes, 
thereby compounding the injuries and deaths that a single drone strike can cause. According to 
one humanitarian worker, there is a six-hour mandatory delay before which it is prohibited to 
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report to the scene of a drone strike to avoid being targeted in a subsequent strike.96 This is 
further exacerbated by the United States’ policy of signature strikes, which, as previously 
mentioned, target individuals on the basis of behaviours rather than confirmed identity. Signature 
strikes make it so that civilians rushing to the scene of an attack may be seen as members of the 
same terrorist group as those targeted in the first strike, thereby becoming targets for another 
double-tap strike.97 In once instance documented by Amnesty International, a double-tap strike 
on 6th of July 2012 was used to target the first responders and rescuers, killing at least six more 
individuals and injuring many more.98  
The use of double-tap strikes violates several principles of international humanitarian 
law, including the principles of discrimination and proportionality, as well as the right to life 
under international human rights law. More than that, the practice of double-tap strikes actually 
functions as a form of collective punishment against an entire population of civilians who live in 
constant fear that, despite their civilian status and lack of involvement in any hostile enemy 
activities, may be the target of a US drone strike. This targeting of civilians and first responders 
constitutes a war crime and violation of common article III of the Geneva Conventions because 
they are being punished for an offense that they did not commit or take any part in 
orchestrating.99 To compound the actual deaths and injuries that result from the use of double-tap 
strikes, the fear that has come to characterize the lives of the people living in North Waziristan 
also raises other human rights concerns, as discussed below.  
Drone strikes have a profound effect on the socioeconomic and psychological wellbeing 
of the populations they target, often preventing them from exercising certain political, social, and 
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economic rights.100 The constant overhead presence of drones and the possibility of a strike at 
any time violates the right to assembly and movement of civilians, as many residents of North 
Waziristan report being afraid to gather in large groups for fear of being targeted due to 
suspicious activity.101 One local reported to Amnesty International that, “People are scared of the 
drone attacks, they don’t walk together; they sit only in pairs and if they gather in large groups, it 
would be only for a very short time. When the drone plane comes and we hear the sound of 
‘ghommm’ people feel very scared. The drone plane can launch missiles at any time.”102 
Particularly, locals pointed out the fear of gathering for prayer in mosques, for fear that the act of 
praying may conflated with suspicious activity or sympathy with terrorist forces.103 The people 
of North Waziristan face a constant security threat to their wellbeing and livelihood because of 
the frequency with which United States drone strikes kill civilians. This knowledge that, at any 
moment, an innocent civilian may realistically be the target or the collateral damage of a drone 
strike, creates an environment of constant fear that affects the ability of residents to exercise their 
other rights freely and the fullest extent.104  
Additionally, drone strikes enact destruction against community structures, often 
destroying homes, health care facilities, and schools and rendering many families homeless and 
unable to maintain an adequate standard of living.105 Given that the majority of drone strike 
victims are men, the death or maiming of the dominant male figure often means that the family 
loses its primary breadwinner.106 This often renders families financially insecure in the long-term 
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and unable to provide its members. Often, in such cases, children must be pulled out of school by 
parents in order to work to economically provide for the family, which is particularly the case 
with young boys who assume the burden of responsibility following the death of the male 
breadwinner.107 This hinders the ability of many children to receive an education, as they become 
burdened with other responsibilities as a result of drone strikes. Furthermore, in many instances, 
it was reported that parents voluntarily pulled their children out of school in fear that the school 
may be destroyed in a drone strike.108 As previously stated, the United Nations has documented 
at least one instance of the United States deliberately targeting a school in North Waziristan, 
killing 80 school children, with the victims as young as seven years old.109 This blatant disregard 
for civilian and child life has led many parents in North Waziristan to fear for the lives of their 
children and the possibility that they may be killed in a drone strike while attending school.  
Furthermore, families often do not have the financial means to rebuild their destroyed 
homes, forcing them to move into the homes of relatives and community members and further 
impeding their right to a decent standard of living.110 These effects are all compounded by the 
United States government’s refusal to acknowledge the adverse effects of their counterterrorism 
operations and the civilian toll, thereby not providing any kind of compensation to the victims.111 
The refusal of the United States to provide reparations will be discussed in subsequent sections 
of this paper. The presence of the United States military drones in North Waziristan has resulted 
in community fracturing and distrust amongst civilians, who live in fear of being targeted not 
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only by drone but also by terrorist networks, who often accuse civilians of spying for the United 
States and providing information regarding terrorist operations.112  
 
Psychological Effects   
The psychological effects of drone strikes on the populations living under them are 
immense and raise serious concerns regarding the use of drones as a ‘moral’ weapon of choice. 
Civilians living in areas frequented by drone strikes live in constant fear that an attack can occur 
at any moment, with drones buzzing over their heads 24 hours a day.113 Civilian populations 
have seen drone strikes hit innocent civilians and destroy the lives of thousands of non-
combatants, and are fearful that they may be targeted on the basis of wrong information or as 
collateral damage at any moment. According to local doctors and residents, many people in 
North Waziristan are plagued with intense anxiety of drone strikes and are unable to go to sleep 
at night without using sleeping pills to ease their fear.114 One resident of North Waziristan told 
Amnesty International, “I have mental tension and anxiety during the night time because of the 
drone attack. I keep tablets under my bed in order to get sleep at night.”115 
The psychological effects of drone strikes are particularly detrimental for children, who 
are terrified of the constant whizzing of drones overhead and who often witness traumatic scenes 
of destruction by drones. Another resident of North Waziristan, Nabeel, outlines the 
psychological dangers of drone strikes on children, telling Amnesty International: “Children 
have lost their mental balance, they are afraid all the time. After seeing the body parts and 
hearing the screaming of the victims [of the 6 July 2012 drone strike that killed 18 people], my 
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young nephew is always scared and crying, running towards his mother saying the drone could 
come and strike again.”116 In a report conducted by the International Human Rights and Conflict 
Resolution Centre of Stanford Law School and Global Justice Centre of New York University 
found that the constant threat of drone attacks triggered post-traumatic stress disorder in many 
residents of North Waziristan. It reads: 
“In addition to feeling fear, those who live under drones–and particularly interviewees 
who survived or witnessed strikes–described common symptoms of anticipatory anxiety 
and post-traumatic stress disorder. Interviewees described emotional breakdowns, 
running indoors or hiding when drones appear above, fainting, nightmares and other 
intrusive thoughts, hyper startled reactions to loud noises, outbursts of anger or 
irritability, and loss of appetite and other physical symptoms. Interviewees also reported 
suffering from insomnia and other sleep disturbances, which medical health professionals 
in Pakistan stated were prevalent. A father of three said, “drones are always on my mind. 
It makes it difficult to sleep. They are like a mosquito. Even when you don’t see them, 
you can hear them, you know they are there.” According to a strike survivor, “When the 
drone is moving, people cannot sleep properly or can’t rest properly. They are always 
scared of the drones.”117 
 
 The aim of this section was to expand the concept of proportionality to understand the 
impacts of drones on civilian populations beyond casualties and injuries. When considering 
whether or not the United States’ drone strikes adhere to the principle of proportionality, one 
must take into account the detrimental effect of drones on the social, political, and economic 
rights of civilian populations. The serious and widespread consequences of drone strikes suggest 
that drones penetrate several spheres of community life in regions targeted by drones and that the 
damage caused by drones is hardly proportional to the benefits of using drones, especially when 
one considers that large portion of the damage is inflicted upon individuals who pose little to no 
threat to the United States, and therefore cannot be justified under the principle of 
proportionality.  
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As has been demonstrated, the effects of drone strikes must be understood as extending 
past the immediate consequences of deaths and injuries. Drone strikes violate fundamental 
social, economic, and political rights of civilian populations. The vast and far-reaching effects of 
drone strikes must be highlighted in order to demonstrate to the international community that 
drones affect numerous aspects of lives for civilians in areas like North Waziristan, and the 
adverse effects that they have compound to constitute a form of collective punishment. Civilian 
populations are punished in many different ways by drone strikes, which impede on their social, 
political and economic rights. The use of drones by the United States to perpetuate these adverse 
consequences against civilian populations is evidence of how drones function as a tool of 
collective punishment. The next section of this paper will focus on explaining and elaborating on 
the reasons behind the relative impunity enjoyed by the United States government and the failure 
of the international community to hold the United States accountable to international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law, even as their counterterrorism operations amount 




Impunity in the Face of War Crimes   
The current policies of the United States government in their authorization of drone 
strikes raise serious concerns within the framework of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law. All indicators suggest that drones will continue to be the weapon 
of choice for the United States going forward, and that drone warfare will become an 
increasingly prevalent military endeavour globally, with over 70 countries currently in 
possession of drone technology.118 Therefore, the need to demand transparency from drone 
wielding governments and develop an adequate international legal framework that is equipped to 
limit and govern the use of drones accordingly must be a pressing concern for the international 
community. The aim of this paper was not to suggest that drones are inherently an immoral 
weapon; in fact, it has been acknowledged by the international community that, if used in a 
manner consistent with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, drone 
technology has the potential to present a more limited and precise form of engaging in armed 
conflict.119 Rather, it was the aim of this paper to illuminate how the current manner in which 
drone strikes are being employed by the United States government routinely violates the human 
rights of those that live in areas frequented by drone strikes, with particular reference to the right 
to life. It further argued that the drone program of the Obama administration constitutes a form 
of collective punishment, which is outlawed under international humanitarian law.  
Drone strikes could, in theory, be used morally and present a more limited and 
discriminatory form of force under specific circumstances.120 However, there are a number of 
factors that currently stand in the way of making this theoretical use of drones in an ethical 
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manner into a reality. The next section of this paper will aim to explore how the United States 
has been allowed to persist in its illegal and unethical drone program for over a decade with 
virtually no consequences, despite the fact that the drone program amounts to a war crime in the 
form of collective punishment. It will investigate the way in which the lack of transparency 
regarding its drone program has hindered and precluded any attempts at international 
accountability. It has facilitated the United States to continue its gross violations of international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law with virtually no repercussions. This paper 
will argue for the requirement for transparency during armed conflict as outlined in Article 51 of 
the United Nations Charter and that the United States government is obliged under international 
law to disclose information regarding their drone warfare program.  
 
A Clandestine Drone Program and the Need for Transparency 
The majority of United States drone operations are conducted covertly through the 
Central Intelligence Agency, who, “refuses to even officially acknowledge its drone programs 
anywhere in the world, let alone describe the rules and procedures it applies for preventing, 
mitigating and investigating potentially unlawful deaths or ensuring compliance with 
international law”.121 This lack of transparency has hindered any investigation into the legality of 
United States drone operations and the, “extensive secrecy surrounding counter-terrorism 
practice in general, and the drone program in particular, has stymied attempts to ensure 
accountability for human rights violations committed in the context of such operations”.122 There 
is concern by the Special Rapporteur that the more limited nature of warfare presented by drones, 
and the use of drones as a clandestine weapon, facilitate a “relative ease with which details about 
                                                        
121. “Will I Be Next?”, Amnesty International, 49 
122. Ibid.  
41 
 
drone targeting can be withheld from the public eye and the potentially restraining influence of 
public concern”.123 Therefore, drone warfare requires a heightened sense of vigilance and 
scrutiny in order to ensure an adherence to international law. The Human Rights Council has 
repeatedly stressed the need for increase transparency, reaffirming, “the importance of 
transparency as a precondition to accountability” given that, without adequate information 
regarding the drone program, it becomes incredibly difficult for the international community to 
hold those responsible for violations of international law accountable for their actions.124  
The lack of transparency and the refusal of the United States to disclose the mechanisms 
through which it targets individuals for drone strikes has allowed it to continue to collectively 
punish entire populations of people with impunity and virtually no consequences. The first step 
in ending this impunity is for the international community to demand that the United States 
government disclose more information regarding their drone policy; a requirement of the United 
States government under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter, which protects the right of member states to self-defence, also makes it 
incumbent upon states to be transparent in their military operations. It states that, “Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to 
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary 
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”125 This clause is considered to 
be the underpinning of the requirement in international law of transparency, which is an integral 
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factor in holding governments accountable and responsible to their obligations under 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law.  
Disclosing information regarding their practices in relation to human rights and 
international law is necessary to allow the international community to evaluate and deliberate the 
legality, or lack thereof, of the actions of a State. Particularly, transparency is important in 
allowing the international community to hold the United States government accountable to its 
use of targeted killings by providing a checking mechanism to ensure that “killings are lawful 
and justified, and the accountability mechanisms that ensure wrongful killings are investigated, 
prosecuted, and punished”.126 This is particularly important when discussing the right to life and 
the use of targeted killing operations; the United States government is required by international 
law to disclose more information regarding these practices in order to provide the international 
community with the information necessary to restrict and properly govern the use of lethal 
force.127 A report by Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions written in 2010 expanded on the requirement of transparency as 
it applies to drone warfare and targeted killings, stressing that States have an obligation under 
international law to ensure that there is adequate information regarding the target, including 
reliable evidence on the effects of the drone strike on civilian populations, the number of 
civilians present in an area and the effects of each individual attack.128 
The United Nations Human Rights Council has expressed concern for this lack of 
transparency that results in a lack of accountability. It has stressed that the disclosure of 
information is required under international law and has called upon states to provide 
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transparency regarding their policies.129 The result of a lack of transparency on behalf of the 
United States government is cause for deep international concern because it results in an 
unrestricted and ungoverned use of force by the United States with virtual impunity for these 
violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The Special 
Rapporteur emphasizes the gravity of the situation, concluding that, “the lack of transparency 
provides the United States government, “a virtual and impermissible license to kill”.130  
The resulting lack of accountability not only allows the United States to continue in what 
has been demonstrated to be an illegal conduct of drone operations, but also limits access to 
justice and effective reparations for those affected by drone strikes. In order to end the current 
impunity enjoyed by the United States government in regard to its policy of drone strikes, the 
international community must demand that the United States release information regarding the 
targets, methods of identification, and casualties of drone strikes.  
There are three consequences of the refusal of the United States to reveal critical 
information regarding its drone warfare program; firstly, it hides from the international 
community the criteria by which the United States targets individual enemy combatants, thereby 
making it difficult to evaluate these criterion in regards to international law; secondly, it means 
that the identities of those killed in drone strikes are manipulated or left unknown, which skews 
the accuracy of reporting on civilian casualties; and thirdly, it allows the United States to 
continue engaging in collective punishment and grave violations of international law with 
impunity for those responsible and no compensation for victims. 
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Criteria: The “Playbook”  
 In August of 2016, after years of campaigning and demands by various human rights 
organizations and a lawsuit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union in 2013 demanding that 
the United States government release the standards used to conduct drone strikes, the Obama 
administration finally released a document that outlines the standard operating procedure, known 
as the Presidential Policy Guidelines.131 The document, written in May of 2013 and entitled, 
“Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United 
States and Areas of Active Hostilities”, provides a redacted version of the guidelines employed 
by the United States government. However, despite the promise of increased transparency in 
counterterrorism operation and the Freedom of Information Act filed by the American Civil 
Liberties Union, the Obama administration has continuously refused to release the actual 
Presidential Policy Guidelines, commonly referred to as the “Playbook”.132 
 The released document has several redacted sections and provides little information 
regarding how individuals are identified and targeted for drone strikes.133 Furthermore, it is clear 
that several of the outlined guidelines found in the document are not being properly adhered to 
by the Obama administration. For example, the document states that, “the United States 
prioritizes, as a matter of policy, the capture of terrorist suspects as a preferred option over lethal 
action and will therefore require a feasibility assessment of capture options as a component of 
any proposal for lethal action. Lethal action should be taken in an effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks against U.S. persons only when capture of an individual is not feasible and no other 
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reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat.”134 However, there is little evidence 
to suggest that the United States adheres to this standard, and in few instances has the United 
States actually prioritized capture of terrorist suspects, opting rather for the use of lethal force, as 
has been previously discussed.135 This willingness and frequency with which the United States 
resorts to lethal force is the topic of much international concern, which has condemned the fact 
that the United States seems to use lethal force in instances in which there is “no evidence that 
the individual killed posed an imminent threat to another individual” and yet no attempt was 
made to capture rather than kill.136 
 The document also delineates three types of targets and the circumstances in which they 
may be targeted. It distinguishes between high-value targets that may be targeted for lethal force 
and non-high value targets that, in certain circumstances, can also be the targets of lethal force 
but only if they pose an imminent threat.137 In reference to the conduct of direct action, the 
document states, “Also absent extraordinary circumstances, direct action will be taken only if 
there is near certainty that the action can be taken without injuring or killing non-combatants. For 
purposes of this PPG, non-combatants are understood to be individuals who may not be made the 
object of attack under the law of armed conflict.”138 While this initial statement of distinction 
seems to adhere to the principle of discrimination under international humanitarian law, the 
document goes on to clarify the specificities of non-combatant status, stating, “The term “non-
combatant" does not include an individual who is targetable as part of a belligerent party to an 
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armed conflict, an individual who is taking a direct part in hostilities, or an individual who is 
targetable in the exercise of national self-defence.”139 
This paper has already problematized the use of self-defence as an ongoing justification 
by the United States government for its extensive counterterrorism operations. Self-defence 
cannot and should not be used to consistently violate international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law. The lack of clarity in the quoted statement regarding exactly 
what makes an individual targetable in the exercise of self-defence raises concerns that the 
United States government may manipulate this phrase in order to violate the principle of 
discrimination and the right to life. Furthermore, there is abundant evidence to suggest that the 
United States government regularly violates not only international law, but also the guidelines it 
has established for itself by targeting and killing civilians who present no imminent or immediate 
threat and are taking no part in hostilities.  
The glaring discrepancy between, on the one hand, the standards and guidelines outlined 
in the document about the PPG and, on the other hand, the extensive reporting on abuses of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the United States 
government implies that the United States government, despite claiming to adhere to 
international law, regularly ignores and violates both international and domestic standards in 
regards to drone strikes and counterterrorism efforts. Even the Deputy Legal Director of the 
American Civil Liberties Union Jameel Jaffer said himself that, “This [document] doesn’t 
provide any more clarity about the substantive standards the government is using.”140 
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Discrepancies in Reporting on Civilian Casualties 
 Discrepancies in the reporting on civilian casualties by the United States government and 
various independent sources and human rights organizations raise concerns regarding the validity 
and honesty of the reporting of the Obama administration as well as the adherence of the 
definitions employed by the United States with international humanitarian law. As previously 
stated, the definition of combatant employed by the United States labels all “military-age males” 
within a target zone as combatants unless they are posthumously explicitly proved to not be 
so.141 This definition already violates the principle of discrimination under international 
humanitarian law, which requires that all measures be taken prior to the use of lethal force to 
distinguish between combatants and civilians. This further allows the Untied States government 
to define a large number of civilians as combatants, which is evidenced by the significantly 
reduced number of civilian casualties it reports as compared to various other sources. The 
Obama administration officially reported that, between 2009 and the end of 2015, it had 
launched a total of 473 counterterrorism strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya, killing 
a total of 2,436 individuals.142 The crucial information, however, was that it was reported that 
only between 64 and 116 of these individuals were reported to be non-combatants, or civilians.143 
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, on the other hand, reports the number of individuals 
killed in total by counterterrorism strikes by the United States in these four countries to be 2,753, 
over 300 more than was reported by the Obama administration.144 More concerning, however, is 
the fact that the Bureau reports the number of civilian casualties to be between 380 and 801, 
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averaging six times the number of civilian casualties reported by the United States 
government.145  
 The failure to accurately and honestly report the number of civilian casualties that have 
been caused by the use of drone strikes in counterterrorism efforts constitutes a violation of 
international human rights and international humanitarian law by the United States government. 
The requirement of accurate reporting of information is critical in ensuring that violations of 
international law, such as the consistent violation by the Obama administration of the right to life 
of civilians living in areas targeted by drones, do not go unaddressed. Transparency as a 
cornerstone of accountability requires that adequate and accurate information be provided to the 
international community, allowing it to ensure that targeted killings are conducted in a legal 
manner and that these violations of international law are investigated, addressed, and prevented 
in the future.  
 
Lack of Recourse and Justice for Victims  
 The lack of transparency and refusal of the united States government to release accurate 
and adequate information surrounding its drone program and counterterrorism operations raises 
concerns not only in regard to the ability of the United States to continue its routine violations of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, but also in its obligation to 
retroactively provide proper recourse, justice, and compensation to those that have been the 
victims of drone strikes. International law requires that violations of human rights be properly 
investigated and that those responsible for the violations be held accountable under international 
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law. 146 The requirement of transparency applies to the process of investigation of human rights 
abuses just as much as it does to the decision-making and targeting process.147 The Human 
Rights Council has expressed concern that, the, “lack of transparency also obstructed the right to 
a remedy and reparation, as well as the requirement to hold persons criminally accountable for 
crimes under international” and that it potentially constituted, “a violation of common article 51 
of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibited any contracting party from absolving itself of any 
grave breach of the Conventions”.148  
 The United States refuses to disclose the identity of those killed in its drone strikes, 
making it extremely difficult for international organizations and human rights advocates to 
accurately identity of victims.149 This refusal to disclose the identity of those killed is not only a 
violation of international humanitarian law, but also allows the United States to not properly 
account for the violations of human rights. By not being transparent about whether or not those 
killed were civilians, the Obama administration excuses itself of the need to provide reparations 
for civilian casualties. In fact, it has been reported by the Human Rights Council that, “not a 
single victim in over 350 drone strikes had been compensated, nor had any information been 
released as to why those individuals had been targeted”.150 This has, effectively, resulted in a 
situation in which the United States government can consistently violate international law, 
committing war crimes in the form of collective punishment, without any repercussions. Not 
only do those responsible for grave violations of human rights go unpunished, but also justice 
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cannot be served to the victims because the United States refuses to acknowledge the vast 




“The death and destruction that costs the US so little to mete out is being recorded in the 
cultures and on the bodies of those who are forced to live under the conditions created by US 
national security policy since 9/11.”151 
 
 In his time in office, President Obama authorized a total of 563 drone strikes, killing up 
to 807 innocent civilians and injuring several thousand more.152 Despite the demonstrated high 
civilian toll that accompanies the United States government’s drone program as part of the War 
on Terror, there is little evidence to suggest that the drone program will relent with the 
introduction of a new governing administration under President Trump. Rather, all indicators 
suggest that drones will continue to be the preferred weapon of military engagement in United 
States counterterrorism operations in the Middle East.153 In fact, the first months of the Trump 
administration have witnessed a massive and disturbing increase in the frequency of United 
States drone strikes in the region, with President Trump authorizing at least 75 drone strikes 
within his first 74 days in office, a rate of just over one drone strike per day.154 This presents a 
troubling escalation of drone warfare as compared to the Obama administration, which 
authorised an average of one drone strike every five days for the duration of his presidency.155 In 
his first ten days in office, President Trump authorized three drone strikes and a US military raid 
in Yemen, reported to have killed up to 30 civilians, including women and children.156 More 
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recently, US airstrikes in the Iraqi city of Mosul between March 17th and 23rd have reportedly 
killed another 200 civilians, including more innocent women and children.157 The War on Terror 
and United States counterterrorism operations continue to result in a troublingly high number of 
civilian casualties.  
 The aim of this paper has been to demonstrate and outline the ways in which the current 
military engagement of the United States government in the Middle East as part of the War on 
Terror in the form of drone strikes violates both international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law. It has shown that the United States regularly violates the basic human rights of 
civilians in areas frequented by drone strikes and that the civilian toll of drone strikes extends far 
beyond casualties and injuries to affect almost every aspect of life in regions like North 
Waziristan in Pakistan. Using this analysis, this paper further argued that the current program of 
drone strikes by the United States government constitutes a form of collective punishment as 
outlined and prohibited in the fourth Geneva Convention. Through illuminating the repeated and 
widespread human rights violations by the United States government, and arguing that these 
violations amount to war crimes in the form of collective punishment, this paper intended to 
emphasize the gravity and magnitude of the violations of international law that the United States 
government has been allowed to perpetrate. The final section of this paper emphasized the need 
for increased transparency as the prerequisite for accountability and the urgency with which the 
international community must take steps to address these atrocities.   
 Nearly sixteen years after the War on Terror was declared by President Bush, global 
terrorism continues to be rampant and there is no indication that the War on Terror has been 
particularly successful in countering violent extremism. Those that bear the burden of the War on 
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Terror and the United States’ counterterrorism operations continues to be the innocent civilians 
that live in areas frequented such as North Waziristan that are frequented by US drones and 
military operations. These civilians pay the ultimate prince for a crime that they did not commit. 
The collective punishment by the United States against innocent civilians must become a 
pressing and urgent concern of the international community, and the failure to ensure 
accountability sets a dangerous precedent for future military engagement using drones, 
undermining the legitimacy and credibility of the entire system of international law that 
safeguards human rights.  
If the international community fails to hold the United States accountable to its actions, 
then the United States will continue to collectively punish innocent civilians and commit gross 
violations of both international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The 
international community must stand up for the fundamental human rights of the most vulnerable 
populations, including the residents of North Waziristan and other drone-frequented areas, and 
this can only be done by asserting to the United States that is does not have a license to kill and 
that it cannot get away with killing whoever it wants, whenever it wants, without any kind of 
repercussions. Only then can the international community live up to the spirit of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and affirm, “the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family”.158  
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